Currently, no DBEs associated with this system are identified by the preliminary DBE calculations (CRWMS M&O 1998a).
CRITERIA
The criteria used in the QA classification of MGR SSCs are provided in procedure QAP-2-3 as discussed in Section 6.1. These criteria satisfy the requirement of Section 2.2.2, Classzfiing Items, of DOERW-0333P (DOE 1998). 
CODES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATIONS

ASSUMPTIONS
5.1
This analysis assumes that the subsurface closure and seal system provides the final closure barriers and seals for the ventilation shafts, north and south ramps, and the exploratory boreholes. These openings provide access from the ground surface to the repository during the pre-closure period. Upon termination of waste emplacement activities and the monitoring period, these openings will be permanently sealed to limit air and water flows and human intrusion. This assumption is based on the system design and SSC functions as established by the Subsurface Closure and Seal System Description Docurnent (CRWMS M&O 1999c), on the MGR architecture as established by Monitored Geologic Repository Architecture (CRWMS M&O 1999b), and the MGR operations as described by Monitored Geologic Repository Concept of Operations (CRWMS M&O 1998b). This assumption is utilized in Section 6.2 to define the system design configuration and system functions.
5.2
This analysis assumes that the amount of water that could be carried into boreholes is small compared to what naturally will be flowing through the fi-acture pathways that are ubiquitous at Yucca Mountain. None of the boreholes will intercept emplacement or access drifts; therefore, if they are a preferred pathway for water to enter the mountain from the surface, they would also likely be a preferred pathway for this water to enter the water table.
Drainage of perched water into boreholes from above the emplacement drifts is assumed to act in a similar manner. Similarly, the access ramps are assumed to be poor pathways for transmitting water from the surface to the repository because of the orientation of these ramps. Thus, it is assumed that the seals for these openings are not relied upon to meet proposed 10 CFR 63 performance objectives. These assumptions are utilized in Section 6.4
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METHOD
The basic process for classifying MGR permanent SSCs is provided by procedure QAP-2-3. Guidance provided by procedure YAP-2.7Q is also used in this analysis. The process consists of establishing the configuration and function of MGR SSCs and identifying the effect of the SSC on MGR radiological safety. This information is then evaluated against criteria provided in QAP-2-3 to determine the QA classification of the particular item. The classification criteria are provided in the form of checklists in procedure QAP-2-3. A copy of these criteria checklists is provided in Attachment 11. The following classification categories are specified by QAP-2-3 to meet the requirements of Section 2 of the QARD (DOE 1998).
Quality Level 1 (QL-1) Those SSCs whose failure could directly result in a condition adversely affecting public safety. These items have a high safety or waste isolation significance.
Quality Level 2 (QL-2) Those SSCs whose failure or malfunction could indirectly result in a condition adversely affecting public safety, or whose direct failure would result in consequences in excess of normal operational limits. These items have a low safety or waste isolation significance.
Ouality Level 3 (QL-3) Those SSCs whose failure or malfunction would not significantly impact public or worker safety, including those defense-in-depth design features intended to keep doses ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable). These items have a minor impact on public and worker safety and waste isolation.
Conventional Quality (CQ) Those SSCs not meeting any of the criteria for Quality Levels 1,2, or 3. Conventional quality items are not subject to the requirements of the QARD.
This analysis method is based on an iterative design-classification process where each analysis iteration is considered a final product for that phase of design. In this case, the system design and the DBE analysis are evaluated to determine which of the system's SSCs require design control under the QA program. The analysis presented in this document, therefore, will be reevaluated as necessary using a methodology appropriate to the level of DBE analysis and system design detail. This approach is consistent with NUREG- (CRWMS M&O 1998b) . In the process of QA classification, if two or more subsystems perform similar fimctions or are similarly classified, these subsystems are classified as a group under the higher level system and not listed individually.
DESIGN BASIS EVENT ANALYSIS
A preliminary analysis of MGR DBEs (CRWMS M&O 1998a) has been performed to determine the effects of internal and external events on facility radiological safety and is utilized by this analysis in the classification of MGR SSCs. The DBE analysis addresses both the DBE fiequencies and dose consequences at the site boundary. This analysis utilizes the results of the DBE analysis to evaluate MGR SSCs against the classification criteria of procedure QAP-2-3.
QUALITY ASSURANCE CLASSIFICATION OF MGR SSCs
The MGR SSCs are evaluated against the criteria of QAP-2-3 to determine the item QA classification level. The results of the MGR preliminary DBE calculations (CRWMS M&O 1998a) are utilized in this evaluation.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this QA classification analysis are provided in Table 1 . This analysis is based on current MGR system design and the preliminary DBE analysis (CRWMS M&O 1998a). As the design of the MGR proceeds and fkther analyses of MGR hazards are performed, this classification analysis will be reviewed for impact and revised as necessary. The MGR classification checklists included in procedure QAP-2-3 are reproduced in Attachment 11. The basis for the classification evaluation is provided in Attachment 111.
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